








The Uruguay Round (UR) agreements were
intended to usher in an international trade
architecture in which all countries, developed and
developing alike, would abide by the same rules –
the notion that “one size fits all”. This perception of
the UR has considerable merit, since all countries
were expected to participate in previous
plurilateral agreements such as those on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures and in new
agreements, such as that on Services. At the same
time all the agreements, including the Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA), contained many provisions
on special and differential treatment (SDT) for
developing countries – clearly acknowledging that
one size does not fit all (WTO 2000b, 2002a).
Soon after the AoA was signed it came under
considerable attack from developing country critics
who felt that the it maintained an imbalance in
trading rules; not only did it not favour developing
countries but it was actually slanted against them.
They argued that the SDT provisions were neither
well conceived nor being implemented, and that the
AoA continued the special and more favourable
treatment of developed countries in the international
trading system. It is fair to say that the AoA was
always considered an interim agreement. It contained
provisions for the initiation of new negotiations,
which duly started in 2000. Now, in the aftermath of
the Doha Ministerial which is supposed to result in a
“Development Round”, it is time to look carefully at
the SDT provisions of the AoA to ensure that they
further the process of development.
The purpose of this article is to review SDT
provisions in the AoA and other UR agreements that
have a bearing on agriculture, and to make
recommendations that make sense developmentally.
Critical to the alleviation of poverty, and essential to
any true Development Round, is progress in
agriculture.
I do not review here all aspects of the AoA that have
a bearing on developing countries, nor discuss the
conceptual basis for SDT – a useful summary of
which is contained in Christopher Stevens’s first
article in this Bulletin (see also Michalopoulos 2001
and 2003). The next section focuses on an
assessment of the implementation of SDT in the
aftermath of the UR. The one after that reviews andIDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 2 2003
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evaluates the new proposals for SDT presented by
developing countries in the agriculture
negotiations. The final section contains conclusions
and recommendations on approaches that may be
useful in structuring SDT provisions in the new
negotiations.
2 Assessment of special and
differential treatment in agriculture
2.1 General considerations
Developing countries were successful in including
in the UR a large number of provisions for SDT on
agriculture. These are to be found in the AoA itself,
in the ‘Decision on Measures Concerning the
Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme
on Least Developed and Net Food-Importing
Developing Countries’ (“the Decision”), and in the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). They include greater
flexibility and longer timetables for developing
countries in cutting domestic support and export
subsidies, substantial differences between bound
and applied tariff rates, and a large number of
exhortations to and non-binding promises of
technical assistance from developed countries.
The question of implementation of these provisions
was the subject of discussions in the run-up to and
during the Doha Ministerial, and these continue in
theWorld TradeOrganisation (WTO) Committee in
Agriculture. There are several problems of
implementation common to all UR agreements,
including the AoA. The first is that many developed
country SDT commitments are either too broad and
general in nature (such as those included in the
preambular statements of the AoA and in the SPS)
to be of any practical significance, or they are of the
“best efforts” variety (such as those on the provision
of technical assistance), which again means that
they are not legally enforceable and developed
countries cannot be held strictly accountable for
failing to implement them.
The unwillingness of developed countries to make
firm commitments is partly because in most cases
the WTO rules on the treatment of developing
countries are identical for all but the least
developed countries (LDCs).1 Singapore and Korea
are supposed to be treated in the same way as
Ghana and Saint Lucia; Argentina and Brazil the
same as Botswana and Kenya. But developing
country capacity to export and compete in
international markets for agricultural exports is
vastly different; and so are their needs for support
and assistance. Developing country members of the
Cairns Group of agricultural exporters should not
be treated the same as small one-crop economies.
There is no economic reason to suggest that some
of the more developed of the developing countries
cannot compete in the agricultural products in
which they have comparative advantage, and there
is very little political support in developed
countries for extending SDT treatment to them.
Indeed, protectionist interests in developed
countries frequently succeed in discriminating
against developing countries on products in which
they enjoy comparative advantage. If SDT
provisions are not differentiated to exclude
developing countries that do not need them, there
is very little likelihood that meaningful SDT
commitments will be made by developed
countries, which will continue to resort to general,
best efforts kinds of commitments whose
implementation is hard to evaluate.
The second general problem is that the
commitments aimed at addressing developing
countries’ institutional constraints were made
without serious consideration of how they will be
implemented. This was manifested in the setting of
the transition periods for implementing the various
agreements. These were set as part of the
bargaining process at the late stages of the UR
negotiations and without much involvement of
developing country officials familiar with how long
it takes to build institutional capacity where it is
inadequate or totally lacking. In some cases, the
time limits for the extensions have already passed
and there is little evidence that countries have
made sufficient progress in institution building to
permit them to implement their obligations fully.
2.2 The provisions for special and
differential treatment in agriculture
Market access
The main market access problem in agriculture is
that the present most-favoured-nation (MFN)
protection in developed countries, as well as their
continuation of export subsidies, creates
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formidable barriers to developing country exports
and undermines their competitiveness in third
markets. Tariffication under the UR provisions
resulted in very high levels of protection in
developed countries on products of interest to
developing countries (UNCTAD 1997).
There is little evidence that the general hortatory
language of the AoA regarding liberalising products
of particular interest to developing countries
resulted in greater cuts in protection on such
products in developed country markets. And it is
unlikely that this central problem can be addressed
by more verbiage and non-binding SDT
commitments in the future.
There is relatively limited provision of SDT in
agricultural products under the Generalised System
of Preferences (GSP), which by and large has
focused on manufactures. However, concessions
on agricultural products have been substantial in
past provisions of autonomous trade preferences to
different groups of developing countries. For
example, the European Union (EU) provides deep
preferences to the developing countries in Africa,
the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP).
The long experience with the GSP suggests that,
while preferences can be, and have been, helpful to
some countries for some products and through
some periods of time, preferential approaches suffer
from a variety of economic drawbacks when they
are used as a means of improving generalised
developing country access to developed country
markets.2 In judging the usefulness of preferences in
the context of the negotiations on agriculture one
should also take into account other developments
affecting agricultural trade in the short term. Most
important is the provision of preferential treatment
by the EU to 76 ACP countries through the
Cotonou Agreement (which envisages Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) involving regional
preferential arrangements (RPAs) coming into effect
in 2008). Similarly, the USA has a preferential
scheme for African countries, and is negotiating the
establishment of a free trade area that would include
all of the developing countries in North and South
America and has proposed a free trade agreement
with South Africa. In addition, the EU already has a
programme (“Everything but Arms”) under which it
will be providing duty- and quota-free access for all
products from the 49 least developed countries.
Other developed countries may set up similar
programmes favouring these countries.
A few years from now, the landscape in agricultural
trade may be one in which LDCs enjoy deep and
mainly unconditional preferences in most
developed country markets. Several sets of regional
preferential agreements may be in the process of
being put in place which would provide deep
preferential margins for a large group of developing
countries in the two major developed country
markets, the EU and the United States (USA). This
would leave a number of countries in South Asia
essentially without preferences, and some in the
ACP and Latin America without preferences in the
USA and Europe respectively. Included in this
group would be a number of major developing
country agricultural exporters, such as Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay, Philippines and Thailand, which
arguably do not need preferences in order to export.
In this setting, a “strengthened” GSP for agriculture
is really not likely to be especially “generalised”. It
could, at best, provide less deep preferences, and
hence smaller benefits, for a relatively restricted
group of developing countries which should, in
any case, exclude those that do not need the
preferences to export. Thus, it is questionable how
much “negotiating capital” developing countries
should spend on this issue.
An alternative approach that would make more
economic sense is to expand the deep preferences
extended to LDCs to a larger group of low-income,
vulnerable or food-insecure developing countries
that exhibit problems very similar to those of the
LDCs (Tangermann 2001). The problem with this
approach is that it runs against the grain of the
political economy of granting unconditional
preferences to a list of countries; and the larger the
group of countries included, the more difficult it is
to cope with the domestic interests in developed
countries which could be affected by the expanded
commodity coverage and volume of trade. In light
of these considerations, it would appear that the
best way of addressing the issue of market access
for agricultural products in the current Round is
not through efforts at expanding or strengthening
generalised SDT treatment, but rather through a
general effort by developing countries to push for
26
substantial reduction of developed country
protection on an MFN basis and total elimination
of export subsidies at the earliest possible time.3
Transition periods
Evidence gathered from the needs assessments
undertaken in the context of implementing the
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical
Assistance for the Least Developed Countries
suggests that very many institutional weaknesses
remain in these countries, and in others where
even shorter time frames for implementation have
been envisaged. Many developing countries,
including but not limited to LDCs, have
experienced difficulties in implementing various
WTO agreements, including SPS. A number of
these transition periods have expired while many
developing countries have suggested that they are
experiencing difficulties in establishing the
institutions needed for their implementation.
Countries facing fiscal constraints often have few
resources to direct towards the areas of public
administration responsible for overseeing and
coordinating the implementation of WTO
agreements, which are quite costly. These
difficulties were supposed to be overcome through
technical assistance and longer transition periods.
The longer transition period of 10 years for
implementation of reduction commitments under
the AoA (Article 15.2) has not yet expired. In the
case of SPS, it is notable that no country has
apparently sought a time-limited exception in
whole or in part from obligations under the
Agreement, although longer time frames
(unspecified) have been explicitly provided for in
Articles 10.2 and 10.3. It is hard to believe, in light
of the frequently voiced concerns of developing
countries in this area, that everything is proceeding
on time in terms of their implementation of the
provisions of the SPS. It would appear far more
likely that they have not formally requested
extensions from the WTO, possibly because of the
fear of adverse reactions towards their exports.
A very careful look at these transition periods is
needed. The review should cover all the areas in which
they have been, or may need to be, extended on the
grounds of institutional weakness. These include SPS.
In parallel, efforts should be made by the countries
themselves, with the support of the international
community, to establish the institutions needed to
discharge their responsibilities under the SPS.
Technical and other assistance
The AoA itself is generally silent on issues of
assistance. The main references to assistance
related to agriculture are included in “the Decision”
and in the SPS.
The Decision
The main focus of developing country discussions
on topics covered by “the Decision” has been on the
question of whether the AoA has resulted in
additional financing needs for the Net Food-
Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs) and
LDCs on account of higher import prices. Perhaps
because the AoA did not change things much, some
of the fears that developing countries which are net
food importers had about its possible adverse effect
did not materialise. There is little evidence that the
export subsidy reductions of the UR agreement
have led to an increase in import expenditures of
poor NFIDCs. Both the IMF and the World Bank
have reiterated repeatedly in subsequent reviews of
the issue in the WTO that there is no need to
provide financing over and above what can be
obtained through their regular facilities.
Even so, it is legitimate to ask what will happen if
developed country export subsidies do decline in
the future; and what is the proper international
response to such a potential problem? The problem
relates to the possible adverse short-term effects on
poor NIFDCs of eliminating trade distorting
measures, which are likely to be outweighed by the
longer-term worldwide efficiency gains. Actually
the short-term effects are also likely to spread out
over time, as the distortions are bound to be
phased out rather than eliminated at a stroke. It
would be very difficult to isolate the impact of the
resulting price increases from other factors,
including the developing countries’ own policies. It
is for this reason that the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) did not provide automatic financing
from its Compensatory Finance Facility (CFF) for
cereals but included drawings from the CFF in the
overall IMF programme to individual countries.
But there is nothing – and there should be nothing
– automatic about the assistance provided. Indeed,
if a need can be shown to exist the international
response should not be limited to food aid but
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should extend to all kinds of general purpose
financing on appropriate terms. The latter would
be better than food aid, which is frequently tied to
procurement from a particular donor and
determined by food stock availability in the donor
country rather than by the needs of the recipient.
Notwithstanding this experience, several
developing countries have proposed the
establishment of a revolving fund facility whose
objective would be to stabilise international food
prices to developing countries. This fund is
intended to be self financing, apart from the initial
start-up capital costs. Many such proposals have
been made in the past, and all have been found
wanting. In part this is the result of cost
considerations. It has also to do with doubts about
the effectiveness of such arrangements in achieving
stabilisation objectives. In any case, it does not
appear that major food exporting countries such as
the USA, whose participation is essential to the
success of such a scheme, would be willing to
change their opposition. Therefore, it would seem
rather futile to persist in making such proposals,
unless simply for tactical considerations. Yet,
following Doha, a new group has been set up to
consider proposals in this area.
“The Decision” also called for a new Food Aid
Convention, which was negotiated in 1999. The
most serious problem developing countries face
regarding food aid, not solved by the new
Convention, is that food aid is least available when
international prices are highest and, hence,
financing needs are greatest.
SPS
The implementation of the SPS has raised
significant problems for developing countries. Some
result from their lack of capacity to develop the
institutional arrangements that would permit them
to meet their SPS-related WTO commitments. But
the greatest potential costs may stem from the
legitimacy the SPS provides to developed country
actions that limit market access for developing
countries. Article 10.1 of the SPS says that: ‘In the
preparation and application of sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, Members shall take
account of the special needs of developing country
Members, and in particular of the least-developed
country Members’. A recent study found that a
1998 European Community regulation which
raised the standards for the minimum level for
certain types of aflatoxin, a toxic substance found in
foodstuffs and animal feed, to levels higher than
those required by the Codex Alimentarius, is
estimated to have cost close to $700 million in lost
revenue to African exporters of groundnuts, many
of them LDCs (Otsuki et al. 2001).
It is difficult to argue against developed country
actions to protect the health of their consumers.
But when such actions result in significant costs to
developing country exports, it would seem fair that
the developed countries be legally committed to
take steps that will help the developing country
meet the problem that the developed country
regulation has created. The existing provisions on
these issues in the SPS are inadequate and need to
be strengthened. Article 9.2 of the Agreement says
that: ‘Where substantial investments are required for
an exporting developing country to fulfil the [SPS]
requirements of an importing Member, the latter
shall consider providing such technical assistance as
will permit the developing country Member to
maintain and expand its market access
opportunities for the product involved’ (emphasis
added). Developed country members should have
the obligation to provide the developing country
with both the financial and technical assistance
needed to permit improvement in quality until the
product meets the standard.
Flexibility in rules and disciplines
Flexibility in the application of rules and
disciplines has emerged as a key area of SDT in all
aspects of implementation of the UR agreements.
In agriculture, there is a serious problem on how to
develop rules appropriate to promoting the
interests of developing countries because the
overall focus of the AoA has been on improving the
policy environment in developed countries. The
philosophy of the Round was driven by the
legitimate concern that agriculture in the
developed countries was protected and supported
too much. Thus, rules were designed to provide
fewer supports in a more transparent and less trade
distorting way, which, if implemented, would have
a beneficial impact on developing countries.
But agriculture in many developing countries was
being penalised, not supported by government
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policy. This was certainly more the case a decade
ago when the UR was being negotiated, and
perhaps even more so in the 1980s, which are the
reference years for the measurement of supports.
Where agriculture was supported, developing
country capacity to provide such support through
budgetary transfers was, and still is, quite limited.
In a way the whole philosophy that drove the AoA
was upside down. However, as the framework for
the AoA was that of developed country agriculture,
the agreed SDT provisions, and even subsequent
developing country proposals to “improve” them,
have been couched in the same upside down
framework. Thus, the AoA provisions in this area
call for flexibility by enabling developing countries
to reduce their Aggregate Measurement of Support
(AMS) and export subsidies by less and over a
longer period of time as well as to exempt a larger
proportion of the supports they provide from
reduction commitments. Yet most developing
countries do not have positive AMS and hence
these SDT provisions are of limited value.
Flexibility, so far, has been provided for the
relatively few countries (15 or so, mostly middle-
or higher-income developing countries) that had
significant positive supports to agriculture, and the
even fewer (10) that had export subsidy
commitments. According to the most complete
recent information available, 40 developing
countries notified the provision of domestic
support to agriculture to the WTO in 1995–2000
(ABARE 2002).4 Probably more countries have
used the provisions than have notified the WTO,
and notifications for most countries are quite
incomplete (FAO 2000).
Only eight countries, mostly high income, notified
support that averaged in excess of 10 per cent of
value added in the agriculture sector. And as value
added is but a small fraction of gross value, none of
these countries came even close to meeting the de
minimis provisions for exemptions. Indeed the bulk
(over 50 per cent) of the total amounts notified by
such countries as Brazil, Korea, Mexico and
Thailand were claimed to be exempt under the
“Green Box” provisions. Few countries claimed
support under the de minimis provisions, and over
85 per cent of the total support claimed to be
exempt was accounted for by just two (India and
Egypt). Finally, investment and input subsidies for
small and resource-poor farmers have been utilised
by a larger number (27) of countries but amounted,
on average, to a little over 5 per cent of total notified
support.
The list of ten countries that notified export subsidies
is instructive in that only one (Indonesia) is classified
as low income by the World Bank.5Marketing and
transport subsidies for exports (Article 9.4) were
used by four countries. A few countries notified
outlays for public stockholding for food security
purposes (Annex 2 para. 3, footnote 5) and domestic
food aid to the poor (Annex 2, para. 4, footnotes
5–6); and two countries (South Korea and
Philippines) notified special treatment provisions in
the protection of a traditional staple, rice (Annex 5,
section B) (WTO 2002a; Youssef 1999).
3 Proposals for strengthening
special and differential treatment
3.1 The main proposals
Over the last several years, developing countries
and others have made a number of proposals in the
context of the ongoing negotiations on agriculture
for rebalancing the AoA to reflect a developmental
perspective. Some of these proposals pertain to
changes in the AoA which would improve market
access conditions. Others have dealt with issues of
assistance to NFIDCs (already discussed), or
involve the establishment of new special safeguard
measures available only to developing countries.
Still others address the issue of increasing the
flexibility in the existing SDT provisions. Some
countries have proposed that these provisions be
included in a “Development Box”, which would
parallel the “Green Box” exemptions which,
developing countries believe, tend to focus on
measures of primary significance to developed
country agriculture. One recent submission states:
Given the fundamental differences in the
agriculture production systems and the
different role that agriculture plays in
developing and developed countries, there is a
clear case for devising a development box
whose provisions would apply only to
developing countries. Agriculture is no doubt
multifaceted, but arguments in this regard
should not detract focus from the concerns and
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specific problems of the rural poor of
developing countries, which the development
box seeks to address (WTO 2002b).
The main developing country proposals for
increasing flexibility in the existing SDT provisions
and inclusion in the Development Box call for:6
n permanent exemptions in the calculation of the
AMS for capital and input subsidies to
resource-poor farmers;
n exceptions from the calculation of the AMS for
measures that are targeted on all or some of the
following: poverty alleviation, rural development
and employment, diversification, food security;
n an increase in the de minimis level of exempt
AMS, either in general or for expenditures
related to enhancing food security;
n credit in the form of non-product-specific
support in the calculation of permissible AMS
for negative product-specific support (to take
account of situations where countries keep
food prices artificially low in order to achieve
food security objectives for the poor and have
to compensate farmers by providing them with
input and other subsidies);
n exemption from the calculation of the AMS not
only of capital costs for transport and other
marketing infrastructure but also the current
transport costs of shipping food from food
surplus to food deficit regions;
n continuation of export subsidies – irrespective
of previous commitments;
n lower rates of reduction of tariffs on agriculture
than those agreed for developed countries and
possible renegotiation of existing tariff
commitments;
n establishment of a new safeguard mechanism
for agriculture for which only developing
countries would be eligible.
In addressing future changes in the SDT provisions of
the AoA, consideration also needs to be given to some
distinctive characteristics of developing as opposed to
developed country agriculture: weaknesses in
institutions and in the operations of markets. In
shaping future public sector involvement in
agriculture, countries also need to take into account
what has worked and what has not, i.e. experience
with “best practice” in government interventions. A
recent World Bank paper says in this connection:
Markets and provision of technology are often
imperfect because of market failure. ... The
poor are in many cases more affected by market
failure than the rich, rural areas more than
urban areas, and women more than men.
Governments have major roles in enabling the
transformation of subsistence oriented rural
areas with low incomes and little diversification
into areas that are well integrated into markets
and with access to modern technology. This
requires considerable public investments in
infrastructure, argicultural research and human
capital. It also requires continuous efforts to
create the appropriate environment for the
development of markets and private sector
investment (World Bank 2002).
The recent World Bank assessment of country
experience noted above suggests that for
developing countries to exploit the advantages of
better access to developed country markets and
freer trade in general, they need investments in
capacity building which are directed towards:
n the development of necessary infrastructure
such as irrigation and improved seeds, as well as
better distribution and communication systems;
n institution building, in the form of research
centres that would improve farmers’ access to
modern production technologies as well as
strengthening processing capacity technologies;
n the establishment of effective regulatory,
standards, and food safety assurance bodies;
n education and training, particularly in
technical areas such as sustainable agriculture,
quality control and packaging;
n support for the development of local farm
organisations especially for marketing and
distribution;
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n programmes in support of product
diversification;
n support for land reform.
Some of the supports that might be provided in
these areas would qualify under the Green Box
provisions; others would not. In light of these
considerations, what should be the thrust of the
revisions to the AoA to make it more development
friendly?What should be in any Development Box?
3.2 Flexibility in commitments
Removing flaws in the current text
First, changes are needed in the legal framework
under which the very important SDT treatment
which exempts investment and input subsidies to
poor farmers under Article 6.2 is provided. These
provisions are currently found not in the Green
Box of subsidies which are permanently permitted
because they are non-distorting, but among the
distorting measures of support which are
temporarily permitted and which would have to be
reviewed before they are continued – as if the
problems afflicting poor farmers which justify
government intervention could be solved in a few
years’ time. The subsidies currently referred to in
Article 6.2 would be actionable under Article 13b
if they exceed the budgetary limit of subsidies
provided in 1992. This means that if a developing
country provides its poor farmers subsidised credit
in excess of that provided in 1992 and is successful
in stimulating increases in their production so that
some imports are displaced, previous suppliers to
its markets could claim “serious prejudice” under
the Subsidies Agreement or “non-violation
nullification” under Article XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (seeMichalopoulos
2001 and Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2002).
It may be unlikely that a developed country
member which saw its exports decline under these
circumstances would complain in the WTO, but
this is not the point. The point is that the
philosophy and current legal basis of the AoA are
not development oriented. These provisions have
to be changed, whether a Development Box is
agreed to or not, in order to provide the legal basis
for permanent exemption of these subsidies from
the AMS calculation.
Another “technical” improvement relates to the way
the AMS is calculated, i.e. based on the gap between
the current administered price and the fixed external
reference price from the 1986–1988 base period.
This provision was inserted in the AoA to help
developed countries which feared that declining
world prices would force them to reduce their
domestic supports. It did not address the concerns
of developing countries, where inflation has
typically been high and where domestic supports
which are expressed in nominal prices may prove
meaningless in real terms (Tangermann and Josling
1999). Again the AoA speaks in vague terms about
‘due consideration’ being given to ‘the influence of
excessive rates of inflation’ on the ability of countries
to honour their AMS commitments. It is clear that
the commitments in the AMS, whatever they are,
need to be made in real terms.
Establishing pro-development principles
One of the fundamental changes that developing
countries should seek to establish in the new
negotiations is that there are certain policies that
may make sense in a development context which
should always be available to developing countries
– or at least to some groups of them. If there is a
Development Box, these are among the policies
that it should include (WTO 2000a, 2002b; Green
and Priyadarshi 2002).
What precisely these policies should be is
something to be discussed and negotiated. To begin
with, one needs to look at the existing provisions
regarding subsidies to low-income and resource-
poor farmers and food security provisions on
government stocks and prices.
First, the concept of “low-income or resource-poor
producers” to which the measures should apply is
difficult to define in practice. Perhaps an
operationally more practical approach would be to
exempt from the AMS programmes targeted at all
households below a certain poverty line (thereby
including households which may not “produce”
anything, but work in agriculture and are equally or
more needy than “resource-poor producers”). This
would include, for example, programmes that
impact on rural labour or on other poor consumers.
On the question of targeting, there have been some
suggestions of targeting “food security crops” (Ruffer
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2002). There are several problems with this. First, the
crops that enhance food security vary from country
to country, which would lead to a complex system of
notifications of different crops by different countries.
Second, it may well be that there are many poor
farmers who do not produce these crops. Should
they be excluded from support? It would seem both
simpler and more equitable to try to exempt from
restraints all agriculture programmes that affect the
rural poor, irrespective of the crops they produce.
On the question of investment subsidies, there is
little to add.Given the problems affecting agriculture
and the poor in most low-income developing
countries, government intervention would be
necessary to strengthen institutional capacity,
improve market operations and provide support to
the urban and rural poor in various ways, including
support to expanding production of individual
products. A good basis is the list of capacity-building
programmes summarised earlier in this article.
These include land reform, helping build small-
farmer organisations, strengthening marketing and
improving financing mechanisms, as well as the
more traditional services provided by governments
which are listed in the Green Box. The programmes
would need to be different, according to whether
they focus on subsistence agriculture, smallholders
or commercial farms.None of the subsidies involved
in them should be included in the AMS.
Regarding the provision of subsidies to inputs
(such as credit, fertilisers, seeds, etc.), past
developing country experience has not been very
good. Many such programmes have failed. Recent
efforts at developing market-based microfinance
mechanismsm, for example, appear to provide a
more viable long-term approach to sustainable rural
credit institutions. Similarly, in many traditional
fertiliser and seed subsidy programmes the benefits
have to a great extent been appropriated by large
farmers. New approaches, involving for example
the provision of vouchers to poor farmers, may
have a better chance of addressing the problem. In
general, market-based approaches involving the
provision of direct transfers to farmers tend to be
superior to traditional input subsidy interventions.
Developing countries are often in a quandary,
however. They have serious budget constraints
which do not permit them to provide a safety net
through direct income transfers for the urban poor.
At the same time, innovative approaches involving
microfinance and direct approaches to input
delivery to subsistence farmers have not been
broadly implemented. Thus they sometimes opt for
a low food-price policy as a second best, which can
be made viable only through input subsidies to
farmers. Clearly the best option in the long run is a
combination of direct transfers and market-based
pricing. In the interim, however, it may be unwise
to limit the existing flexibility provided by the
exclusion of input subsidies to poor farmers from
the calculation of AMS.7
Similarly, subsidies to internal transport costs to
move food to deficit areas may be the most effective
way, in the short term, to promote food security in
such regions. But these subsidies should also apply
to moving imported food to these areas.
It is clear that operations of emergency food stocks
should be included in some fashion in the
Development Box. It may well be that some
clarification of the existing provisions on this score
should be considered (for details see Diaz-Bonilla et
al. 2002). But they may need to be limited in total
value and also not involve discrimination against
foreign suppliers.
Finally, programmes in support of product
diversification for small economies dependent on
one or two export crops should be specifically
exempted from reductions in AMS. At present, the
exemption in Article 6.2 is limited to
diversification from ‘growing illicit narcotic crops’ –
again, primarily a developed country priority. On
the other hand, small, low-income developing
countries, including a number of small island
economies, which clearly need to diversify their
production and export structure in order to reduce
their vulnerability to external shocks do not enjoy
an exemption from the AMS for such programmes.
It should be considered the right of developing
countries to pursue all these programmes. They
should be included in a Development Box to
establish that they are not considered aberrations
or exemptions.
The question of raising the de minimis exclusion may
be moot if a well-defined Development Box is agreed
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upon. There is no evidence that the 10 per cent
threshold has limited developing countries in
providing the necessary support to agriculture, and
hence it is unclear whether it is necessary to increase
the de minimis provision to, say, 15 per cent. Similarly,
it is unclear whether the proposal to permit
developing countries, which have negative support
for certain items as a consequence of consumer food
subsidies, to offset these against positive support in
the calculation of the AMS would be necessary if a
truly adequate Development Box were agreed upon.
In general, raising the de minimis exclusion should be
viewed as a second-best alternative to the
establishment of a Development Box that provides
cover for measures developing countries need to take
to promote agricultural development.
Problem areas
Finally, the Development Box should exclude
border measures. Tariffs and similar measures raise
prices to consumers and have a large adverse
impact on poor consumers (who spend a greater
percentage of their incomes on food) while
benefiting mainly the bigger agricultural (and food)
producers (who have larger quantities of products
to sell). A case could be made in the negotiations
for a slower pace of tariff reduction by developing
countries (see Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2002). This is not
an issue for the Development Box, however, but
rather one of the overall principles to be used in the
market access negotiations.
The issue of export subsidies should be considered
separately. They are obviously trade distorting
(perhaps even more so than many forms of
domestic support), and are not affordable by most
developing countries. The problem here is more
political than economic. It may not make much
sense economically for any country to subsidise
exports. But since in the past developed countries
have done so and most developing countries have
not, even reduced export subsidies leave developed
countries with a commercial advantage over
developing countries. An attempt was made in the
past to correct this asymmetry by allowing
developing countries slower reductions in export
subsidies. Even greater differentiation is probably
needed in future commitments in this area – not
because export subsidies are a good thing which
developing countries should use, but in order to
create a more level playing field.8
As targeted programmes to help the poor may be of
importance to developing countries irrespective of
their size or level of income, they should, in
principle, be available for all developing countries
to pursue – with the sole exception of major food
exporting countries. A more narrow definition
could focus SDT provisions to address food
security on food-insecure countries, which would
result in a somewhat narrower list of countries (see
Stevens 2002). But note that the existing NFIDCs
listing suffers from shortcomings, as it contains
countries which are not likely to be considered
food insecure (Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2000). The
“diversification” exception, however, could be
limited to small, low-income developing
economies which are dependent on one or two
crops for the bulk of their export earnings.
There are several problems with determining any list
of countries that should benefit. One is that the
longer the list the more likely it is that the bulk of the
benefits would accrue to the more developed of the
countries included. At the same time, for such a list
to be both credible and politically acceptable among
developing countries, it would have to include the
large Asian economies such as China, India and
Pakistan, where the bulk of the world’s rural poor
are to be found. And if these major agricultural
producers are included, protectionist opposition in
developed countries is likely to increase. Moreover,
the list of countries eligible for benefits under the
Development Box would need to be consistent with
the list of those which need access to generalised
preferences to improve market access.
In the end, of course, any list would be the result
of political compromise and would tend to contain
some degree of arbitrariness. In fact, probably any
listing that effectively takes into account the
development considerations raised above is likely
to be an improvement over the situation that
prevails today.
3.3 Safeguards
Another important concern of developing
countries is the capacity of their poor farmers to
adjust to a sudden upsurge in agricultural or food
imports. This potential danger exists in general and
is exacerbated by the continued legitimacy of
export subsidies in agricultural trade.
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The problem of import surges is neither new nor
limited to agriculture. Most developing countries
have some degree of leeway because their bound
tariff levels are much higher than the rates actually
applied. Simple (unweighted) applied agricultural
tariffs for 31 developing countries (excluding
Cairns group members) averaged 25 per cent,
compared with 66 per cent for bound rates, which
suggests that there is considerable scope for
increases in agricultural protection if desired
(Michalopoulos 2001). Also, there are general
provisions to deal with import surges under the
safeguards provisions of the WTO.
The problem with the existing situation is two-fold,
however. First, the margins between applied and
bound tariffs are likely to shrink as part of the
overall liberalisation that will occur in the new
Round. Second, the existing safeguards provisions
may be difficult and time-consuming to
implement. And at the same time, poor farmers in
developing countries do not have access to the
kinds of safety net that are available to producers of
farm or other products in developed countries.
This means that an upsurge of imports could have
catastrophic effects on poor producers (see FAO
2002a). Of course, the long-term solution to this
problem is the establishment of adequate safety
nets in these countries, but this will take time. In
the meantime something needs to be put in place
to deal with this issue. This could take the form of
a special safeguard provision for agriculture
available only to developing countries – and
perhaps excluding the main food exporters. It
could be that these safeguard provisions are
included in the Development Box, or they could be
free standing.
Different variants for a safeguard mechanism have
been proposed. One is a mechanism which acts
like a countervailing action against developed
countries which subsidise their exports. But there
is little reason to differentiate the plight of poor
farmers affected by such actions from that of others
equally hurt by import surges caused by other
factors. Another proposal is that the special
safeguard be limited to raising tariffs or to raising
them by a certain proportion (Ruffer 2002). It
would appear that these proposals may not be
desirable as they would tend to complicate the use
of the mechanism.
The key characteristics of a special safeguard
mechanism for agriculture, which could be invoked
only by developing countries, should be that:
n it is transparent and easy to use (e.g. through
the determination of price or quantity
thresholds);
n it is time limited, and
n developed countries do not seek compensation
as under the regular WTO safeguard provisions.9
4 Conclusions and priorities for
the future
This analysis and assessment of the SDT provisions
in the WTO agreements suggests the need for a
fundamental reorientation of priorities by both
developed and developing country members of the
WTO.
The overall objective of the international community
should be a more meaningful and real provision of
SDT treatment through appropriate instruments to
countries that truly need it. A true Development
Round of negotiations on agricultural trade has to
address the legitimate concerns of developing
countries, especially those that are low income and
least developed and face the greatest food insecurity,
on how to develop their food and agriculture
sectors. The conceptual underpinnings of the
reorientation should be provided by the evolving
understanding of the links between agricultural
trade and development and the constraints faced by
different developing countries in their effective
integration in the international trading system. Some
of this reorientation involves the general provision of
SDT treatment, some is specific to agriculture. The
main priorities are as follows:
1. Greater emphasis should be placed on
strengthening developing country institutional
capacity. Transition periods in the WTO
Agreements linked to developing country
institutional capacity weaknesses need to be re-
examined. A number of these transition
periods have already expired and need to be
addressed urgently. The review should include
panels of experts from governments and
appropriate international institutions with
knowledge of capacity-building efforts and
requirements in the respective areas.
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Developed countries must increase the
coherence between agricultural trade policy
and aid to food and agriculture in developing
countries. This means, first, avoiding dumping
surplus agriculture or food products at
subsidised prices on to developing country
markets, while simultaneously providing
assistance to increase production; second,
providing food aid when food prices are high
and import needs greatest; and third,
strengthening developing country capacity to
meet SPS standards.
2. There is a need for sharper differentiation between
developing countries in the provision of SDT.Many
problems of institutional capacity common to
LDCs and other low-income developing
countries with limited participation in
international trade are not faced by more
advanced developing countries. Food security
and per capita income and/or share of world
trade indicators need to be introduced to
expand the focus of assistance to capacity
building. Such assistance is needed, together
with the more traditional SDT provisions of
‘more favourable treatment’ and better access
to developed country markets.
Differentiation and graduation will be difficult
for developing countries to accept. Substantial
differentiation already exists, however, in
respect of financial flows from all international
finance institutions and even from the United
Nations Development Programme. Why
should a principle which has been accepted
without serious difficulty on issues of finance
not be acceptable regarding trade? It may be
difficult to do, but an effort needs to be made.
3. Developing countries should seek improved access
in developed country markets for agricultural
products primarily on an MFN basis. This can be
achieved through:
n reductions in tariff peaks;
n elimination of remaining quantitative
restrictions;
n elimination of developed country export
subsidies as soon as practible, but in any
case at a faster rate than that applied to
developing countries.
4. Efforts at improving the agricultural GSP should
focus on providing deep preferences, such as those
currently available or to be made available to
LDCs, to other low-income, food “insecure” or
vulnerable countries. One way to help
developing countries that truly need assistance
in breaking into foreign markets is to exclude,
through graduation, those developing
countries which do not need it.
5. There should be a Development Box of measures
to enhance the food security and stimulate the
agricultural production of the rural poor in
developing countries on a permanent basis.
These measures should not be articulated as
exceptions to reductions in AMS, but rather as
developing country rights. Included in this box
should be elements of SDT now included in
Article 6.2 of the AoA, expanded as appropriate
to provide:
n direct and indirect investment and input
subsidies or other supports to households
below a poverty line in order to encourage
agricultural and rural development; such
supports could be general, or product
specific, provided they are effectively
targeted to the rural poor;
n programmes that support diversification in
the agriculture of small, low-income
developing countries dependent on a very
small number of commodities for their
exports;
n foodstuffs at subsidised prices in targeted
programmes aimed at meeting food
requirements of the poor, whether urban or
rural, as part of an overall effort to enhance
food security.
6. There should be a new special safeguard provision
available only to developing countries introduced
into the AoA. Its purpose should be to provide
quick but time-limited protection against
import surges that could hurt poor producers.
7. A new provision should be introduced mandating a
regular review of SDT implementation. This could
be done through a systematic annual review of
donor assistance commitments and other
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measures taken in favour of developing
countries. Alternatively, a similar systematic
review could be undertaken on a country-by-
country basis in the context of the Trade Policy
Reviews for developed country WTO members.
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Notes
1. There is another exception: in the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing measures a special per
capita income cut-off has been established.
2. There is a long literature on this topic. Some
examples include Karsteny and Laird (1987);
Onguglo (1999); UNCTAD (1999); Topp (2001).
3. See FAO (2002b) for approaches to cutting tariffs by
formulas that are beneficial to developing countries.
4. ABARE (2002) in fact lists 41 countries, but
Mongolia had not been classified as a developing
country when it acceded to the WTO.
5. The ten countries are: Brazil, Colombia, Cyprus,
Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Romania, Turkey, Uruguay
and Venezuela (WTO 2002a).
6. See WTO (2000a–d); WTO (2001a, b); Green and
Priyadarshi (2002). A number of these proposals (by
India, the Small Island Economies, the Dominican
Republic, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) were reiterated
during the Special Session of theWTO Committee on
Agriculture, 4–8 February 2002 (see Ruffer 2002).
7. It should be noted in this regard that “low food
price” policies tend to have a net negative effect on
poor farmers (Ruffer 2002).
8. There are, of course, a number of other important
issues in the negotiations pertaining, for example, to
the future rate of AMS reductions by developed
countries, limitations on their use of Green Box
subsidies and export credits, etc. These are not
discussed here as they are not SDT measures in
favour of developing countries, but rather involve
developing country proposals to level the playing
field by having developed countries accelerate the
reductions in their trade-distorting policies.
9. The limitation in time raises the question as to what
should happen if the cause of the problem (e.g. a
developed country subsidy) persists. There are two
answers to this. First, developed country export
subsidies are supposed to be phased out over time. If
they are not, then the developed country would be
in violation of its commitment and could be
countervailed under the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. Alternatively, the special
safeguard could provide for a review after a certain
period of time. The point is that the special safeguard
should not provide a cover for long-term protection.
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